The Internment Enquiry

Testimony of Major-General J.E.B. Seely
Special Service Officer, Staff of Sir John French

Testimony Background and Arrival Major Jack Seely gave evidence describing his position as a General Staff officer attached to the Royal Naval Division during the operations around Antwerp. He outlined his prior association with Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges and indicated that his presence with the Division was in a staff capacity rather than as a unit commander. On arrival in the Antwerp sector, Major Seely described a situation in which the defensive line was still holding and morale appeared steady. He found British and Belgian troops occupying the forts and trenches, with no immediate indication that a general withdrawal was imminent. At this stage, he understood that the British forces were contributing materially to the defence and that the position, while under pressure, was not yet collapsing. Holding the Line and the Evacuation of Forts 1 and 2 Major Seely summarised his movements along the defensive line, stating that conditions remained stable until the evacuation of Forts 1 and 2. Up to that point, he believed the line to be intact and functioning as intended, with troops holding their positions despite artillery fire and increasing enemy pressure. The evacuation of these forts marked a turning point. Seely described how their abandonment altered the tactical situation, exposing flanks and undermining the coherence of the defence. From this moment, the possibility of continued resistance diminished rapidly, and attention began to shift toward withdrawal rather than sustained defence.
Decision to Retreat and the Conveyance of Orders From the point at which retreat was decided, Major Seely described a degree of uncertainty and hesitation at senior levels. He recalled that Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges continued to demur, expressing doubts about the necessity or timing of a withdrawal even as the situation deteriorated. Major Seely explained that arrangements were made for a retirement, and that the British had, by this stage, played their part in the defence of Antwerp. He understood that the order to withdraw would be conveyed to the Brigades through staff channels, and that he himself was tasked with carrying orders to troops holding a fixed point between Forts 4 and 5 on the Malines Road. However, while he was clear about the geographical point to which he was to go, Major Seely stated that he could not remember to whom the orders were addressed or which officers were to receive them. This uncertainty as to the precise recipients of the withdrawal instructions is a notable feature of his evidence. Contact with Lord Kitchener and Orders to Withdraw Major Seely described informing Brigadier-General Paris of his intention to attempt to communicate with Lord Kitchener. He subsequently discussed the situation with summoned officers and conveyed what he believed to be the necessary instructions for withdrawal. He explained that he acted on the understanding that the British troops on both flanks were in the process of retiring, and that the overall position made continued occupation untenable. Reports reaching him reinforced his belief that the defence was being abandoned in an orderly fashion and that his role was to ensure that the remaining troops received timely warning and direction. Major Seely stated that he believed he was giving the order to withdraw to those responsible for troops in the sector he was visiting, though his testimony reflects uncertainty as to precisely which units and commanders were involved. Evacuation, Deception, and Withdrawal Major Seely went on to describe how reports were brought to him regarding the evacuation of positions. He explained that efforts were made to maintain the appearance of occupation in the trenches, in order to deceive the enemy as to the true state of the defence. He stated that German forces appeared to believe that the trenches remained fully manned, and that this deception allowed British and Belgian troops to disengage with less interference than might otherwise have been expected. Major Seely understood that, at the time he left, the evacuation was proceeding as planned and that the movement across the bridges was being conducted successfully. By this point, he believed that no British troops remained in Antwerp itself and that the withdrawal was effectively complete. Departure from Antwerp and Movement West Major Seely testified that he ascertained trains were available at St. Nicholas and proceeded by motor to Zwijndrecht, where he found that Brigadier-General Paris had issued orders for all troops to be in readiness to move. Some units, he believed, were already on the road. He described conversations with Brigadier-General Paris concerning the withdrawal and stated that he took steps to satisfy himself that all troops had been warned and were moving away from the threatened area. He then continued his own movement westward, estimating that his final departure from the area took place in broad daylight, sometime between 4 and 5 o’clock. Realisation of the Brigade’s Absence Major Seely stated that it was only later, during discussions between General Paris and General Rawlinson, that it became apparent a Brigade had been left behind. He recalled that General Rawlinson had arranged shipping for the evacuation, and that the assumption at higher levels was that all British troops were clear of the Antwerp area. The subsequent discovery that one Brigade had crossed into Holland came as a realisation after the event, rather than as a known or anticipated outcome at the time the withdrawal was believed to have been completed. General Summary of Subsequent Questioning In the remainder of his evidence, Major Seely was questioned on his understanding of the chain of command, the clarity of orders issued, and the assumptions made regarding the movements of the Brigades. His answers repeatedly returned to what he believed at the time rather than what could later be shown to have occurred, and his testimony reflects reliance on inference and report rather than direct confirmation. Assessment of the Evidence Major Seely’s testimony presents a picture of events viewed from the perspective of a staff officer moving rapidly between positions in a deteriorating situation. His evidence is marked by confidence in the general necessity of withdrawal, but also by notable uncertainty regarding the precise transmission and receipt of orders. While he believed that the retirement was being conducted coherently and that all British troops were withdrawing in accordance with instructions, his inability to recall to whom orders were specifically addressed raises questions about how clearly those instructions were conveyed. His reliance on assumptions — particularly regarding the withdrawal of flanking troops and the completeness of the evacuation — stands in contrast to the experience of officers who later found themselves isolated. Major Seely does not identify himself as responsible for the Brigade that was left behind, and his evidence suggests that he regarded the matter as falling within the remit of higher command. At the same time, his testimony illustrates how a chain of belief and assumption, rather than confirmed communication, contributed to a misunderstanding of the true position on the ground.