October 1917 ... The Mud of Passchendaele

On October 2nd, the Division was taken by train to Hopoutre and put under canvas near Poperinghe, acting as the reserve for the attacks of the fourth, which were part of the third offensive at Ypres. Not being required during the day's action, the Division was taken by motor bus to rest billets. Following the collapse of Russia, attacks were required in this area to contain the large number of German troops there and prevent them from being moved to the Italian front. The overall aim was to break out of the Ypres salient and capture the ridge that dominated the plain. This, in turn, would lead to the taking of the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge, from where the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr could be threatened. The capture of Zeebrugge would also halt the growing U-boat menace operating out of the port. Earlier action at Passchendaele had been a partial success, Sir Douglas Haig reporting that it was the mud that had prevented further progress. The Germans were able to observe the Allies' preparations from the high ground and withdrew to the ridge, leaving the vulnerable plain below.
The Division remained at Hertzeele and trained hard in preparation for the upcoming attack. Commander Arthur Asquith, son of the former British Prime Minister, considered the training insufficient, as a great deal of time was spent repairing and laying the roads and duckboards in the area. Captain Ligertwood of the 2nd RMLI recognized that the hopeless state of the battlefield would disorient the men and ordered banners to be made from strips of red cloth attached to pieces of wood. These would be carried into battle for the men to rally around. The Royal Naval Division would relieve the 9th Division, which had only been able to make small advances in almost impossible conditions. The area was flat and marshy, crossed by numerous streams and liable to flooding during heavy rains. The conditions were a major advantage for the troops defending positions. The Division would support the Canadians in three attacks, the first two of which were scheduled for October 26th and 30th. The Canadians were to advance the line along the ridge, whilst the Royal Naval Division would capture all enemy positions on the Allied side of the Paddebeek, with the exception of Sourd Farm, and then push the line forward level with Tournant Farm. On the twenty-fourth, the Division returned to the canal bank near Ypres. HQ clerk Thomas MacMillan called the scene the most godforsaken he had ever seen. It was covered with brown water dyed with blood, where horses and men lay partly buried, with blank eyes staring. It was difficult for the field batteries, as they could be consumed in the spreading pools of water that dotted the landscape. Anybody stepping from the duckboards would instantly sink up to the waist in mud. Every morning, the bodies of horses, mules, and troops had to be removed from the duckboards for the roads to be repaired. Horses that were stranded in the flooded shell holes or stuck in the mud were shot to put them out of their misery. The stench of rotting bodies hung in the air. There was no frontline to speak of, just a few scrapings in the mud with pockets of machine-guns and riflemen. The German positions were no better, and, following two days of shelling, the trenches had caved in, leaving mud holes.		The Ypres salient, the area between the RND's divisional boundaries is shaded
The battlefield prior to the RND assault
In the early hours of the twenty-sixth, a downpour of rain commenced, and as the barrage lifted at 05:45, advancing fifty yards every four minutes, the 188th Brigade picked its way across the quagmire in the dark, with the rain still falling. The 1st RMLI was on the left of Anson, with the 2nd RMLI and Howe battalions to advance through once the first objectives were taken. Immediately, a German barrage fell, and the battlefield was raked by the enemy's machine-gun and rifle fire from the numerous pillboxes and strong points that littered the battlefield. The 1st RMLI made good progress and, by 07:20, had captured Banff House, the battalion's last objective, and Anson reported the capture of Varlet Farm. However, it later became evident that the Anson battalion had captured the ruins of another building located nearby, and that the farm no longer existed—Varlet Farm by this time being only a few marks in the mud. Progress through the middle was impeded, and by 08:00 it was clear the attack was stalling on the road between Bray Farm and the village of Wallemolen, in the face of the weather and the murderous fire coming from the numerous German strong points. The sailors dug in near Source Trench. The Germans repeatedly counterattacked the ruins near Varlet Farm but were thrown back each time. The Howe and 2nd RMLI battalions continued the press on the flanks. During this second wave, the company of 2nd RMLI under Captain Ligertwood had to cross the swollen Paddebeek. Ligertwood had already been wounded three times but continued to advance with his men rallying to the banners. He was wounded again, this time fatally, but, raising himself up on one elbow, he cried out, "There's your objective, lads, get it!" The effort consumed the last of his strength, and he sank back, dying in the mud of Passchendaele. In the Howe assault, Thomas also became a casualty, sustaining a bayonet wound to his left wrist and a severe bayonet wound to his upper left thigh. The latter wound would see him returned to England, but he would recover sufficiently to rejoin the Division and serve until he was demobilized in 1919. Two companies of Hood had been attached to the 188th Brigade for the day's action, and Commander Asquith watched from the Division's old front lines as the attack stalled in the centre. He ordered the companies of Hood to take positions in readiness for an enemy counterattack. A little later, reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were still in position and could move in between the attack and the old front line, and a third company was ordered up. At 08:30, a report was received from the Canadians that they had not linked up with the Royal Naval Division. Asquith, with one forward observation officer, went to investigate. As he moved forward, he came across the pocket of Anson men near Varlet Farm. An enemy machine-gun had been brought up, and the area around the ruins was under intense fire. On his arrival, Asquith called in artillery support, which silenced the machine-gun. He then continued forward to the advanced positions of the battalions on the right-hand side of the attack. On making contact, he informed them of the position of the Canadians, and the two units were able to link up. The action of the commander was a decisive factor on the day, as the flank of the Canadians was now protected and the artillery could safeguard the new frontline. No further advance was attempted in the afternoon, as fresh troops could not be moved to the front except under the cover of darkness, and the depleted units needed to protect the advances that had been made. At 17:00, the Germans counterattacked on the left, and the 2nd RMLI was thrown back, having run out of ammunition and having no water. As the unit fell back, it collected the garrisons at Banff House, Bray Farm, and Berks House. A company of the Hood battalion intervened, and a full-scale retreat was prevented. A company of Hawke quickly established a position on the Division's side of the Paddebeek and recaptured the three buildings before making contact with the Hood battalion. This position appeared to be untenable, as the two units came under fire from the area held by Anson near Varlet Farm. Fearing the position had been lost, Asquith again went forward to investigate and, on arrival, discovered only seven men remained. He headed back to the Division's lines and brought forward a relieving platoon. The 188th Brigade had made substantial gains of between 300 and 400 yards during the day but had suffered an average loss of five hundred men for each of its battalions. The killed-in-action figures for the action of the twenty-sixth are recorded as: If you want, I can also polish it slightly for readability and flow while keeping the historical tone and HTML intact—it would read more smoothly without changing facts. Do you want me to do that? 1st RMLI 98 2nd RMLI 98 Anson 86 Howe 80 Others 42 That evening General Gough sent the following communication to the Division: Please convey to all ranks engaged in today's operations my very great appreciation of their gallant efforts. They have my sincere sympathy, as no troops could have had to face worse conditions of mud than they had to face owing to the sudden downfall of rain this morning. No troops could have done more than our men did today, and given a fair chance, I have every confidence in their complete success every time. And on the twenty-seventh: Please assure all troops engaged that I thoroughly appreciated their fine effort yesterday under terrible conditions of ground and weather. The ground gained by the Division is of great importance, and the determined fighting of other divisions contributed in no small degree to the important success achieved on the main ridge. The rigidity of the attacking line had revealed its weaknesses in this situation, as enemy positions had been left despite the overall objectives being achieved. The pockets of the defending force provided a very fluid defence. Attacking units operated in isolation, with no cohesion. Communications were severely restricted between the units, and upon reaching an objective, there was no way of relaying the success to other units. The weaknesses had been identified, but it was impossible to modify the tactics for the next attack at such short notice after three weeks of preparation. On the twenty-eighth, Thomas was admitted to the 55th General Hospital at Boulogne, and two days later, the 190th Brigade launched the second attack at 05:50. The enemy adjusted the line of its barrage just prior to the attack, and the Brigade suffered heavy casualties. By the time the battalions had reorganised, they had lost the barrage they were to advance behind. The attack moved forward with the Brigade on either side of the swamped Lekkerboterbeek creek. Little progress was made, with many of the Brigade having to advance through thigh-deep mud. Close-range machine guns kept the Brigade pinned down, and the men were picked off one by one. The Brigade struggled to hold its own, but by the end of the day, they had gained a little ground and were able to support the Canadians, who had captured Source Farm. Casualties for the five days between the twenty-sixth and thirtieth totaled 3,126, and the overall objective had still not been achieved. The Canadians had captured the ridge but would be unable to maintain their pressure on the enemy if advances were not made on the Royal Naval Division's front. The First Army had taken over control of the front and ordered that the Paddebeek be crossed by November 6th. It was under these circumstances that the Division demonstrated how it had come to be regarded as one of the Army's elite units. The Division had identified that mobility, reconnaissance, surprise, and personal leadership by senior officers were all necessary to overcome the German defence system in the prevailing conditions. These requirements were impossible to meet with a conventional attack. The ease with which the 190th had relieved the 188th and extended the line in the dark resulted in a new tactic being proposed to the XVIIIth Corps Command. Consent was readily granted. The Division's battle plan had been completely revised, as the 189th Brigade relieved the 190th on the night of October 30th-31st for the third attempt to cross the Paddebeek.
The advance of the RND at Passchendaele
On entering the trenches, the Brigade sent out patrols to survey the area, locating the positions of the German defenses at various points. The following night, operations began. An officer and eleven men advanced on the concrete stronghold at Source Trench. The group reached the wire 80 yards from the position and split into three, each trying to locate a way through the wire. The group on the left came under fire, but the other two groups remained unobserved. The officer regrouped all the men on the right-hand side and attacked. The action was a complete success, with thirteen prisoners taken, the remainder of the garrison having been killed. The attackers did not suffer a single casualty. On the other side of the Division's sector, a similar success was achieved and another stronghold taken, this attack even managing to capture a ration party arriving at the stronghold. The following night, the Hawke and Nelson battalions were relieved by Drake and Hood. The relieving battalions immediately sent out patrols to observe the next targets. The following night, Sourd Farm, which contained a large number of German troops, was taken. Hood, meanwhile, pushed the line forward over the Paddebeek and was able to link up with Drake at the farm. The overall objective of the attack had been achieved. As soon as this had been accomplished, Tournant Farm was reconnoitered for the following night's attack.
The Royal Herbert Hospital, Woolwich	It was discovered that Tournant Farm was a strong point that held a large number of the enemy, and the main garrison was surrounded by a number of outlying pillboxes. In taking the pillboxes, the central garrison would be alerted to the assault. These findings were relayed to Corps Command, who ordered the Division to abort the attack if it became apparent that the Germans would put up strong resistance. The outlying posts were captured, but German activity had been intense, and the attack was called off following the Corps Command order. On November 5th, the Division was relieved by the 1st Division, and the following day Thomas was admitted into the Royal Herbert Woolwich Hospital from the hospital ship St Andrew. Casualties had been very light for the Division's actions in November, with only seventeen men lost and a further 148 wounded. The Division had experimented with tactics and captured objectives that would have cost hundreds of lives using more conventional methods. It was supposed by the authorities that this was not applicable to a wider context, and it would only be in 1918 that the Army would acknowledge the true value of specialised tactics being applied to a particular situation, long after the Division had realised their worth.
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