The Internment Enquiry

Testimony of Commander V.L.A. Campbell
Commanding Officer, Drake Battalion

Testimony The Order to Retire and Withdrawal from the Trenches Commander Victor Campbell stated that he would not go further back than the date the retirement from outside Antwerp was ordered, 8th October, 1914. He recalled that on the evening of the retirement the last message he received from Commodore Henderson was that some of the 1st Brigade (Commander Campbell thought it may have been Benbow) were being sent to take over forts which Commander Campbell had earlier reported had been evacuated by the Belgians. About 7 o’clock that night his battalion experienced a German attack which was repulsed and not pressed. Commander Campbell repeatedly stressed that, four years on, he could not be certain of precise times or some names. Shortly after the attack, Colonel Seely and another officer came to him and told him to retire as soon as possible. Commander Campbell replied that Drake was part of the 1st Brigade and that he must communicate with Commodore Henderson; Colonel Seely told him that the Commodore and the rest of the 1st Brigade had already retired and that Commander Campbell was to rendezvous with them at a place he believed to be Zwyndrecht (though he was uncertain of the name). Commander Campbell said Colonel Seely gave him the route by which he was to retire, and thought he may have shown a written order, but could not be certain.
Commander Campbell sent a runner towards the forts on his left, hoping to find a battalion of the 1st Brigade; the runner returned unable to find anyone there. He then found that the battalion of the 2nd Brigade on his right was already leaving the trenches. He stated he had been ordered to retire after the 2nd Brigade, and that he was also told a company of one of the Royal Marine battalions would act as rear-guard, to be found at a named place he could no longer recall. He withdrew his battalion, keeping the machine guns until the last and keeping them firing, met the Royal Marine company as arranged, and then retired through Antwerp by what he believed was the Malines Gate. He encountered Colonel Seely twice during the retirement, Colonel Seely being in a motor car: once outside Antwerp before reaching the gate, and once inside the city when the bombardment and debris made navigation difficult. Commander Campbell then crossed a pontoon bridge, describing the approach through the city as confusing in the darkness, and noting a great blaze and smoke to his left which he believed were burning oil tanks. Zwyndrecht and the Absence of the 1st Brigade On the far side of the bridge Commander Campbell met a Royal Marine battalion (Plymouth Marines under Colonel Matthews) and proceeded to what he believed was Zwyndrecht, where he enquired for Commodore Henderson and the rest of the 1st Brigade. Unable to find them, he reported personally to General Paris. Commander Campbell stated he was told that the 1st Brigade had not arrived and that Headquarters had no knowledge of where they were; Colonel Bridges was present with General Paris and was understood by Commander Campbell to be attached to his staff. It was also at this halt that Commander Campbell learned the line or station near St. Nicolas had been cut or taken by the Germans, and he was ordered north towards St. Gilles with a Royal Marine staff officer sent to guide him. Movement North and Entraining the Battalion Commander Campbell described his battalion by this stage as “absolutely dog-tired”. Before reaching St. Gilles, Colonel Bridges passed in a motor car with motor buses; Commander Campbell asked for assistance for wounded men and those too exhausted to march, and Colonel Bridges sent back the buses and his car to pick them up. At St. Gilles, Colonel Bridges entrained Drake and some other details, told Commander Campbell he was in command of the train, and ordered him to proceed to Ostend. Commander Campbell recounted arriving after a long journey at Blankenberghe, finding Colonel Parsons senior officer there, spending the night, then travelling onwards by light railway or tramway to Ostend, where he reported to General Paris. Clarification of Colonel Seely’s Instructions Commander Campbell was taken back to the moment Colonel Seely gave him the order to retire. He stated he was quite certain Colonel Seely definitely informed him that Commodore Henderson had retired. He could not say Colonel Seely used Commodore Henderson’s name explicitly, but Commander Campbell understood unmistakably that the 1st Brigade had already gone, because it was said in answer to Commander Campbell’s insistence that he must first report to the Commanding Officer of his brigade. He added that another officer was present in the dug-out during this conversation (the Commanding Officer of A Company, Sir John Campbell), and that they later discussed what was said, both having heard Colonel Seely’s statement in the same sense. Commander Campbell estimated that he left his trenches at about 7 o’clock, after dark, and that he therefore had every reason to suppose the remainder of his brigade was ahead of him and that he would find it at the rendezvous point. The Halt at Beveren Waes Commander Campbell described the halt at the rendezvous point as very brief, with no food and practically no rest. He let the men lie down while he went to report, and stated that Colonel Bridges, as he remembered it, came out and actually gave him his subsequent instructions. During this short halt an alarm of German attack was raised and Commander Campbell was told by Colonel Bridges to detail two platoons to guard the road entrances; before moving north he had to recall these platoons. Commander Campbell believed the same place at which he reported was also where he heard that the railway near St. Nicolas had been cut. When offered place names in questioning, he recognised Beveren Waes as the place with the large village square and troops lying about on each side, and identified this as the place where he reported. He stated that he reported the arrival of Drake and said he had been told to rendezvous there with Commodore Henderson and the remainder of the 1st Brigade; it was then he was told they had not arrived and their whereabouts were unknown. He could not say whether this was said by General Paris or Colonel Bridges. The Drake Battalion’s Position in the Trenches Commander Campbell was questioned on the line Drake held in the trenches. He stated the Malines Railway cut the line in the centre; his left rested on forts on the eastward side of that railway, and his right was in touch with a battalion of the 2nd Brigade. He believed his sector ran roughly from Fort 4 to Redoubt No. 10, eastward of Fort 5, though he did not know fort numbers with certainty. On his left flank the fort was occupied by Belgians, and beyond that was Colonel Maxwell’s battalion, Collingwood. There was no direct trench-to-trench connection on his left, though he had communicated by runner during the day; his trenches “butted on” the fort, but there was no direct touch with the battalion to his left. Final Clarifications on the Withdrawal Commander Campbell confirmed again that his orders from Colonel Seely were to retire after the 2nd Brigade. Asked whether there was any mention of his left flank, he replied that the force on his left was the 1st Brigade, which he had been informed had already gone. He confirmed the flames from burning petroleum were on his left as he crossed the pontoon bridge, but not near enough to feel heat, and that he crossed to Tête de Flandres. He did not see Colonel Ollivant present when Colonel Seely gave him the retirement orders. On whether Colonel Seely went ahead to the rendezvous, Commander Campbell said Colonel Seely overtook him in a motor car shortly before Malines Gate, and was seen again in Antwerp shortly before crossing the pontoon bridge, helping him find the way; that was the last he saw of Colonel Seely, and he never met him afterwards. Commander Campbell did not remember any officer superintending the crossing at the bridge; many people were crossing, chiefly Belgians, and the movement was slow. Commander Campbell stated Colonel Seely did not tell him to report when the flanks were clear or when evacuation on right and left had begun. He withdrew after waiting for the 2nd Brigade battalion on his right to clear, splitting his battalion in the process. He stated there was nobody in the forts on his left when he left, and that he had already sent a runner to determine who was on that flank. He understood the order was simply to rendezvous with the 1st Brigade at what he believed was Zwyndrecht, later thinking it was intended to be Beveren Waes, and that he had no further information beyond that. Finally, Commander Campbell stated he was quite certain that at Beveren Waes either General Paris or Colonel Bridges told him that the 1st Brigade had not turned up; he could not say which officer, but was convinced it was one of the two. Assessment of the Evidence Commander Campbell’s evidence is of particular value because Drake was the one battalion of the 1st Brigade that successfully withdrew from Antwerp and returned to England. His testimony therefore provides a rare battalion commander’s perspective on how the retirement orders were understood and acted upon within the Brigade’s sector. A central feature of his account is his certainty that Colonel Seely informed him that the 1st Brigade had already retired, a statement which he understood as explaining why he could not first communicate with Commodore Henderson. This belief shaped his actions and his expectation of finding the Brigade at the appointed rendezvous. His evidence also highlights the fragility of command and communication once the withdrawal was underway. Uncertainty over place names, reliance on verbal assurances, and the absence of direct supervision at key points such as the pontoon bridge all contributed to a situation in which units could withdraw successfully in isolation while the whereabouts of an entire brigade remained unknown. Taken as a whole, Commander Campbell’s testimony reinforces the impression that the safe escape of Drake was not the result of superior information or coordination, but of circumstance, endurance, and the acceptance of instructions that were believed to reflect the wider situation — beliefs that were later shown to be misplaced.